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ABSTRACT. Collusion in auctions affects both revenue and efficiency and
are prevalent. Yet, sellers do not use collusion-proof auctions as often
as they should. Why is that? We find that one reason for this could be
the cost of implementing efficient collusion-proof auctions. We use Cali-
fornia highway procurements data, to estimate the cost of implementing
collusion-proof auction. Our estimates show that cost must increase by at
least 10.8% to ensure efficient outcome. The cost can sometimes be as high
as 48.8% (depending on the size of bidding-ring in the data).
Keywords: Public Procurement, Collusion-Proof Auction; Local Polyno-
mial, Efficiency-Revenue Trade-off
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, auctions have become synonymous with buying and sell-
ing. Timber sales, financial assets, highway procurement and online adver-
tisements, all use auction. A contract with many agents may be suscepti-
ble to collusion, which is quite prevalent. See Comanor and Schankerman
[1976]; Feinstein, Block, and Nold [1985]; Lang and Rosenthal [1991]; Porter
and Zona [1993]; Bajari [2001]; Porter and Zona [1999]; Pesendorfer [2000];
Asker [2008]; Harrington [2008]; Taibbi [2012, 2013] among others.1 Collu-
sion lowers revenue and leads to inefficient outcome Ausubel and Milgrom
[2006]. Yet most auctions that we see in the data are standard auctions,
auctions that are vulnerable to collusion. Why aren’t auctions that are ef-
ficient and less vulnerable to collusion more common, given that collusion
has first-order effect on auction outcome?
The answer to this question cannot just be that such collusion-proof auc-
tions are more difficult to run. It cannot also be that the seller can stop
1 Since bidding rings are secretive, these instances surely underrepresent the real in-
stances of collusion.
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collusion by barring those who collude because detecting collusion is diffi-
cult, see Bajari and Ye [2003]; Aryal and Gabrielli [2013].2 Cartels often go
to a greater length to keep its existence secret and anonymous, see Asker
[2008] and references therein. Even when we know their identity, it might
be difficult to prove any wrong doing. For instance in the Libor scandal,
the banks implicated in a law suit have asked a federal court in New York
to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the plaintiffs have failed to prove collu-
sive behavior, see Hou and Skeie [2013]; Taibbi [2013] for more.3
The thesis of this paper is that implementing auctions that are robust with
respect to collusion is too costly. To reach that conclusion we first estimate
the distribution of bidders’ cost from the California highway procurement
data, then simulate the cost of running an auction proposed by Chen and
Micali [2012] (henceforth, CM) that is resilient to collusion and always guar-
antees efficient allocation. The increase in cost is the price of achieving effi-
cient allocation. We chose CM-auction because it is simple and like Vickery
(see below) is dominant strategy solvable and hence is a “detail-free” auc-
tion. We find that procurement cost could increase by no less than 10.8%,
and sometimes even as high as 48.8%! The cost depends on the size and
number of bidding rings, something that is unknown to the researcher and
hence must be determined from the data.
To understand why efficiency might be so costly when bidders collude it
is important to understand the auction rules. Unlike the standard auction,
in CM-auction bidders report a bid and their affiliation to any bidding ring.4
Once the bidding rings are determined, the auction rule is similar to Vickery
auction: the lowest bidder wins the auction but gets a price that is equal to
the lowest bid from outside the winner’s ring. Since the price received by
a ring is not a function of the bids by ring members, truthful bidding is an
2 Aryal and Gabrielli [2013] implemented their tests and found no evidence of collusion
even though they focused only on bidders who failed Bajari and Ye [2003]’s tests.
3 The size of Libor market is large, estimated to be anywhere from $350 to $800 trillion.
4Truthful reporting of one’s affiliation is achieved by off-the-equilibrium punishment
phase where bidders pay a fine if their affiliation reports are inconsistent, for example when
any two bidders are inconsistent about their ring-identity.
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equilibrium. For more on coalition strategy-proofness see Green and Laf-
font [1979]. Just like Vickery auction, CM-auction is efficient, but it comes
at a price - the incentive for the bidder to report their group affiliation.5
To run CM-auction we need the distribution of bidders cost and the iden-
tity of ring members. We estimate the distribution by following Guerre,
Perrigne, and Vuong [2000]. To identify the ring members, we divide bid-
ders into two types: regular bidders (type 1) and fringe bidders (type 2),
Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer [2003]. Regular bidders are the ones who bid
in expensive contracts, valued at $1 million or more and are the only types
who can collude. Then we follow Bajari and Ye [2003] to determine bid that
are not consistent with competitive bidding. Of the twenty-five type 1 bid-
ders, we focus on only fifteen bidders. If all these bidders form one ring, the
worst case for the seller, the CM-auction increases the cost of procurement
by 48.8%.
If some bids are inconsistent with competitive bidding Bajari and Ye [2003],
then it will affect the distribution of the cost. To correct that we follow Aryal
and Gabrielli [2013]. We assume that the coalition is rational, so all bid-
ders maximize the sum of total payoff. Then we only use the lowest bid
from coalition members to estimate the bid distribution. Remaining bids
are “cover bids,” and hence need not be depend on bidders cost. When we
also exploit the frequency of simultaneous bids amongst these fifteen bid-
ders, we find that only four of them fail the test. Then when we consider a
coalition of only four bidders, the price of implementing CM-auction drops
to 10.8%. Since the steps to determine ring members is never full proof, we
remain agnostic and say that the cost of procurement could increase by any-
where from 10.8% to 48.8%, but the steps outlined in this paper can be used
in any other data.
To estimate the bid distribution, instead of the widely used kernel-smoothed
density estimators that are inconsistent at the endpoints of the support, we
use the local polynomial estimation (henceforth, LPE) method, see Fan and
5 See also Laffont and Martimort [1997, 1998, 2000]; Che and Kim [2006] for Bayesian
implementation.
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Gijbels [1996]. Using LPE automatically takes care of this boundary issue
without trimming the data.6
This paper is organized as follows: Section (2) outlines the models, iden-
tification and estimation; Section (3) proposes the collusion-proof mecha-
nism; Section (4) explains the data and the ways to determine the colluding
bidders; Section (5) presents the empirical findings; Section (6) concludes.
Choice of bandwidths, tables and figure are collected in the Appendix.
2. MODEL, IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
In this section we consider a procurement auction, i.e. a low-price sealed
bid auction with asymmetric bidders: regular and fringe bidders. The sec-
tion is divided into two subsections. The first subsection considers the
model with and without collusion and covers nonparametric identification.
The second subsection deals with estimation.
2.1. Model and Identification. For every auction ` = 1, 2, . . . , L, a single
and indivisible project is procured to N` ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders using first
price sealed bids mechanism. The essential characteristic of the project for
each auction is summarized by a random variable X` ∈ R++, which for us
will be the engineer’s estimate of the project. We assume that there are two
types (k = 0, 1) of bidders with nk` type k bidders, for auction `, such that
N` = n0` + n1`.
7 In every auction ` a type k bidder draws his cost, i.i.d.
across all other bidders, from Fk(·|X`, N`). Further, we assume that the costs
are independent across auctions. Now, we consider two cases: competition
and collusion.
2.1.1. Competition. The set of observables W is
W :=
{
X`, n0`, n1`, {b0i}n0`i=1, {b1i}n1`i=1,
}
, ` = 1, 2, . . . L.
where bki is the bid by type k ∈ {0, 1} bidder i ∈ nk`. Then we make the
following assumptions:
Assumption 1. (A1)
6As far as we know, the only other paper to use LPE in empirical auction is Gabrielli and
Vuong [2010], who use it to propose a
√
n− consistent semiparametric estimation method.
7We abuse the notation to use nk as both the number and set of type k bidders.
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(1) Exogenous Participation: Fk(·|X, N) = Fk(·|X) for k = 0, 1.
(2) For each ` and each k ∈ {0, 1} the variables Cki`, i ∈ nk` ∼ iid Fk(·|·) with
density fk(·|·) conditional on X`.
(3) An auction ` has N` ∈ {n, n} risk-neutral bidders with n ≥ 2.
(4) The three- dimensional vector (X`, n0`, n1`) ∼ iid Qm(·, ·, ·) with density
qm(·, ·, ·) for all ` = 1, 2, . . . L.8
(5) The observed type k ∈ {0, 1} bids Bk ∼ iid Gk(·|X`, N`) with density
gk(·|X`, N`).
A strategy for bidder i of type k is a strictly increasing, type symmetric
bidding strategy sk : [c, c]→ [c, c]. Type k bidder i solves
max
b
Πk(bi; ci, X`, N`) = max
bi
(bi − ci)
∏
j∈nk\{i}
(1− Fk(s−1k (bi)|X`))j
∏
j∈nk′
(1− Fk′(s−1k′ (b)|X`))j
= max
bi
(bi − ci)
∏
j∈nk\{i}
(1− Gk(bi|X`, N`))j
∏
j∈nk′
(1− Gk′(bi|X`, N`))j,
where k 6= k′ ∈ {0, 1} and Gk(b|X`, N`) = Fk(s−1k (b)|X`) is the probability
that bidder j ∈ nk`\{i} will bid less than b, and likewise for k′.9 The first
order condition for i ∈ nk` is
(bki − cki) = 1
(nk` − 1) gk(bki|X`,N`)1−Gk(bki|X`,N`) + nk′
gk′ (bki|X`,N`)
1−Gk′ (bki|X`,N`)
. (1)
This first order condition with the boundary conditions sk(c) = c, k = 0, 1
uniquely characterizes optimal bidding strategy for all bidders. The model
structure is the type specific conditional distribution of cost {Fk(·|X`)} for
k = 0, 1 given X. But since the data provide information on the character-
istics of the project that is being procured, X` in the `th project, we can con-
sider only the type specific conditional cost distribution Fk(·|X`), k = 0, 1 as
the structural parameter. The question of identification is to ask if there are
two pairs of cost distributions {F0(·|X`), F1(·|X`)} and {F′0(·|X`), F
′
1(·|X`)}
8We abuse the notation to use nk` to represent both the random variable and its realiza-
tion and Q(·) is a product of absolutely continuous measure and a counting measure.
9 The second equality follows from Assumption (A1.1)- exogenous participation. This
mapping between bids and valuation distribution under equilibrium condition is due to
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000].
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that are observationally equivalent. Evaluating (1) at the estimated bid dis-
tribution and densities, we see that for each auction `, bid bki uniquely de-
termines the cost
cki = b`ki −
1
(nk` − 1) gk(b
`
ki|X`,N`)
1−Gk(b`ki|X`,N`)
+ nk′`
gk′ (b`ki|X`,N`)
1−Gk′ (b`ki|X`,N`)
, (2)
thereby identifying {F0(·|X`), F1(·|X`)} that is consistent with the data.
2.1.2. Collusion. Now, we also consider a model where some of the type 1
bidders collude. We maintain all the afore mentioned assumptions. For ev-
ery auction `, let M` ⊂ n1` be the set of bidders who collude. We focus on
efficient collusion where the colluders have access to a centralized mecha-
nism that can control the bids placed by the members in the real auction. So
there will be only one serious bid in each auction from the bidders in M`
and the rest will be just cover-bids. We also assume that the bidders outside
the ring are unaware about the ring. This means that when we map the ob-
served bids to the underlying cost we consider only the minimum bid b∗1`
among the bidders in M` and the bids by everyone outside M` to estimate
the type 1 bid distribution and density G∗1 (·|·, ·) and g∗1(·|·, ·). Then, we can
use these estimates instead of G1 and g1 in (2) to recover the pseudo cost for
each non-members. But for the the minimum bid we use
cˆ1` = b∗1` −
1
(n1` − (|M`| − 1)) g
∗
1(b
∗
1`|X`,N`)
1−G∗1 (b∗1`|X`,N`)
+ n0
g0(b∗1`|X`,N`)
1−G0(b∗1`|X`,N`)
, (3)
where the main difference from the non-colluders is that while the non-
colluders think they are competing with n1` type-1 bidders and n0` type
0 bidders, the ring knows that it is competing with only n1` − (|M`| − 1)
bidders. For type 0 bidders, just like with the type 1 non-colluders, the only
difference is that the appropriate type 1 bid distribution and density are,
respectively, G∗1 (·|·, ·) and g∗1(·|·, ·).
2.2. Estimation. In the first step we estimate the conditional bid distribu-
tions Gk(·|X, N) and the bid densities gk(·|X, N) given the engineer’s esti-
mate X and the set of bidders N, using Local Polynomial Estimation (LPE)
method, see Fan and Gijbels [1996]; Gabrielli and Vuong [2010].
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Consider a bivariate i.i.d. data {Xi, Yi}ni=1. Our interest is the regres-
sion function m(x0) and its derivatives m′(x0), m′′(x0) and so on till mp(x0).
Hence, we regard the model E[Y|X] = m(X). Under the assumption that
(p + 1)th derivative of m(·) at x = x0 exists, LPE can approximate m(·) by a
polynomial of order p. Taylor expansion gives
m(x) ≈
p∑
j=0
mj(x0)
(x− x0)j
j!
,
and this polynomial is fitted locally by a weighted least squares regression
that minimizes
n∑
i=1
{Yi −
p∑
j=0
β j(x− x0)j}2Kh(Xi − x0),
where h is the bandwidth, Kh(·) = K
( ·
h
)
/h with K a kernel function. If
βˆ j, j = 0, . . . , p is the solution to the weighted least squares then it is clear
that j!β j(x0) is the estimator for mj(x0), j = 0, . . . , p. For us, Y will be the in-
dicator function and hence β0(·) will be the LPE estimator of the conditional
bids distribution and its first derivative β1(·) will be the corresponding den-
sity. The exact form used for our estimation is given in Appendix (A-1). We
make the following assumptions for estimation.
Assumption A3:
(i) The kernels KG(·), K0g(·) and K1g(·) are symmetric with bounded hyper-
cube supports and twice continuous bounded derivatives with respect to
their arguments,
(ii)
∫
KG(x)dx = 1,
∫
K0g(x)dx = 1,
∫
K1g(b)db = 1
(iii) KG(·), K0g(·) and K1g(·) are of order R− 1. Thus moments of order strictly
smaller than R− 1 vanish.
Assumption A4: The bandwidths hG, h1g and h2g satisfy
(i) hG → 0 and
LhdG
log L
→ ∞, as L→ ∞,
(ii) h0g → 0, h1g → 0 and
Lhd0gh1g
log L
→ ∞, as L→ ∞.
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From this assumption it is clear that it is possible to choose the optimal
bandwidths, i.e. the bandwidths proposed in Stone [1982]. Unlike GPV we
do not need to specify a “boundary bandwidth” since the local polynomial
method does not require knowledge of the location of the endpoints of the
support. Therefore, it is not necessary to estimate the boundary of the sup-
port of the bid distribution. This is necessary when one needs to trim out
observations, which we do not given that our estimator is not subject to the
so–called boundary effect. We have 3 conditioning variables, one that is
continuous and two that are discrete. Thus, we have to adapt the definition
of the LPE to the present case. However, the discrete variables do not affect
the asymptotic properties of the estimator, so in order to choose the optimal
bandwidth the relevant number of covariates to consider is the number of
continuous variables. 10
We will denote by p the number of continuous variables and by d the to-
tal number of conditioning variables. For our application, d = 3 and p = 1.
Let ψˆ = gˆ(·|·, ·)/1− Gˆ(·|·, ·) be the estimator of ψ(·|·, ·, ·) = gk(·|·, ·, ·)/1−
Gk(·|·, ·, ·). From Proposition 1 in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] we
know that Gk(·|·) is R + 1 times continuously differentiable on its entire
support and therefore gk(·|·) is R times continuously differentiable on its
entire support as well.11 Given the smoothness of each function we propose
to use a LPE (R), i.e. a LPE of degree R, for Gk(·|·, ·, ·) and a LPE (R− 1) for
gk(·|·, ·, ·). Following Fan, Gasser, Gijbels, Brockmann, and Engel [1993] we
can show that the bid distribution is consistent and following Guerre, Per-
rigne, and Vuong [2000] it is easy to see that the estimated costs are strongly
consistent. The exact econometrics model and the selection of optimal band-
width are explained in Appendix A-1.
3. COLLUSION PROOF MECHANISM
We begin with an example, adopted from Chen and Micali [2012] and for
more formal and through treatment we direct the readers to that paper.
10 Similar observation is made by Abadie and Imbens [2006].
11From Proposition 1 by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000], we also know that the
conditional density g0(·|·, ·) is R+ 1 times continuously differentiable on a closed subset of
the interior of the support and thus the degree of smoothness closed to the boundaries and
at the boundaries of the support is not R + 1.
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Example 1. Consider 4 risk neutral bidders with cost (1, 1, 100, 100) and the first
and second bidders collude together. Furthermore, suppose that they have a wrong
belief about the types of the other two bidders. In particular they believe that their
respective costs are (0.1, 2). Under competitive second price auction one of the two
bidders will sell the object at 100. Under collusion they could adopt the following
strategy: 1 bids 1 and 2 bids 100. The real bids will then be (1, 100, 100, 100) and
hence the coalition gets a surplus of 99 which can be shared easily between the two.
Now, suppose bidders report their bids (the price at which they are willing to sup-
ply the public good) and their coalition membership, if any. The winner is the bidder
who announces the lowest price and the price is equal to the second highest price
outside of the winner’s coalition, i.e. the price paid by a coalition is not controlled
by them. To see this, consider the following announcement (1, {1, 2}), (1, {1, 2}),
(100, {3}) and (100, {4}). This ensures strategy proof-ness and the object is sold
to coalition for 100.
The example shows that the mechanism is a slight variation of classic sec-
ond price auction, now with respect to coalitions rather than a singleton.
Let there be N < ∞ risk-neutral bidders in an independent private value,
low bid auction. Each bidder draws i.i.d cost C ∼ F(·).12 Let C represent
the partition of players such that each element of the partition represents
a coalition such that every singleton {i} ∈ C is an independent bidder,
and M is a generic element. The set was {{1, 2}, {3}} in the example. Let
M = {N, F(·),C} be the context of the game and is commonly known by all
the bidders. Moreover, we assume that for every coalition M ∈ C, the |M|−
tuple cost profile CM = {Ci : i ∈ M} is common knowledge only amongst
the bidders in that coalition. The seller, however, only knows {N, F(·)}.
Let {Ai, Pi}Ni=1 be an allocation and pricing rule, where Ai ∈ {0, 1} such
that
∑
i∈N Ai = 1 and Pi is the price paid by the bidder i. We assume that
all coalitions are efficient and hence when the ex-post utility of a bidder i is
(Pi − Ci)Ai, the utility of the coalition M is the sum across the members, i.e.
uM =
∑
i∈M(Pi − Ci)Ai. Each member i ∈ M acts to maximize uM(·).
12For notational ease, we treat all bidders to be symmetric, extending it to asymmetric
bidders is straightforward.
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Definition 1. An auction, for a contextM, is directly collusive if the set of pure
strategies for i, si(·) consist of the set of all mapping from C 7→ (C, M).
So, a bidder with cost C reports his cost and the coalition M. Let uM(s)
denote the total utility of coalition M when everyone uses symmetric bid-
ding strategy s(·). Now, we are in a position to define dominant-strategy
truthfulness and coalitional rationality.
Definition 2. An auction is collusively dominant-strategy truthful if, for all coali-
tion M ∈ C and all strategy profiles sM := {si(·) : i ∈ M} and s−M := {sj(·) :
j 6∈ C\{M}},
∀i ∈ M : uM((Ci, M), s−M) ≥ uM((C′i , M′), s−M).
and is coalitionally rational if uM((Ci, M), s−M) ≥ 0.
Let s(·) = {(C1, M1), . . . , (CN, MN)} be an action profile. Then a disagree-
ment (in s(·)) is an ordered pair (i, j) such that Mi 3 j but Mj 63 i. In other
words, we say that (i, j) is disagreement if i claims to be a part of collusion
ring Mi that contains j but j does not reciprocate. Given a profile s(·) the
outcome (A, P) is computed as follows: First, there is the punishing phase
if there is any disagreement, in which case Ai = 0 for all i. Then to deter-
mine the price we start with Pi = 0 and for each disagreement (i, j) charge
Pi = Pi + 2t and Pj = Pj − t, while keeping t with the seller.13 Second, when
there is no disagreement we initiate the standard phase where from the re-
ported coalitions the coalition partition C is constructed. Then, the lowest
bidder wins the auction and we determine the winning coalition M∗ and
charge
Pi =
{
0 if AM∗ =
∑
j∈M∗ Aj = 0
C1:(N\M∗) o/w
to every bidder i, where C1:(N\M∗) is the lowest bid from the bidder j 6∈ M.
Theorem 2. Chen and Micali [2012] The mechanism outlined above is (a) Collu-
sive dominant-strategy truthful; (b) Coalitional rational and ; (c) Efficient.
13 This punishment phase is off the equilibrium path and does not affect the estimation
results.
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Now, in the next section we analyze the data and determine the sets of
coalitions that are used for the counterfactual exercise later.
4. DATA
The aim of this section is to explain the main features of the data and to
explain how we determine the colluding rings. The data consist of the High-
way procurements in the state of California between January 2002 and Janu-
ary 2008, where the rights to maintain and construct highways and roads are
granted through sealed low-bid auctions (procurements) by the California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans).14 The data include information
about the characteristics of the projects that were let, the name of bidders
and their bid in each auction. The timing is as follows. First, during the
advertising period that lasts between three to ten weeks depending on the
size of the project, the Caltrans Headquarters Office Engineer announces a
project and solicits bids.15 Potential bidders express their interest by buying
the project catalogue. Second, sealed bids are received only from among
the potential bidders. Third, on the letting day, the received bids are ranked
and the project is awarded to the lowest bidder, provided that the bidder
fulfills certain responsibility criteria determined by federal and state law.
After each letting, the information about all bids and their ranking is made
public.
We divide bidders into two broad types of asymmetric bidders: the fringe
bidders (type 0) who bid in small projects and are infrequent and the main
bidders (type 1) who participate frequently and in bigger projects. The pri-
vate cost is interpreted as a reduced form of the real cost of production and
depends on many unobservable characteristics of the bidder. The data con-
sist of 2,152 projects awarded by Caltrans for a total of $7,645 millions but
we focus only on 1,907 projects that had at least two bidders. Of all bidders,
only 823 bidders bid at least once. In the remaining subsection we deter-
mine the set of bidders who fail the tests proposed by [Bajari and Ye, 2003]:
14 The data is publicly available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/esc/oe/awards/
bidsum/.
15 Some examples of projects include asphalt repaving, road paving, bridge reconstruc-
tion, striping the highway, constructing, replacing and widening brides, storm damage
repair, etcetera.
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the colluders. We find that the fifteen type 1 bidders, who bid simultane-
ously more often on a pairwise basis, fail at least one of the conditions by
[Bajari and Ye, 2003] for competitive bidding. Since we do not know the
true collusive ring, we further explore some other features in the data in a
hope to narrow the set of members in the ring. Looking at the frequency
of their bids and their winning patterns we narrow the coalition to only
four bidders. The exact process is explained in the reaming of this section.
The main difficulty with this exercise is to determine the set of colluders,
so the way we determine these two sets should be taken as suggestive and
exploratory.16
4.1. Bidding Ring. To identify the ring members, we focus only on the
projects that are worth between $1 million and $20 million as smaller projects
are unlikely to be worth the risk. There are 724 such projects that worth
$2,408 millions (31% of the total) with 413 bidders out of which 202 win at
least once. Furthermore, following the literature we define regular bidders
as bidders who have a nontrivial revenue share (at least 1% ) in the mar-
ket. Twenty-five bidders satisfy this criteria and will henceforth be called
the type 1 bidders and the remaining bidders are the fringe (type 0) bidders
– see Table A-1. The first column is the index of the bidders while the sec-
ond column gives the number of bids of each of them. To assess the market
power of each bidder we define “expected win” (see below) and compare
it with the actual number of wins: bidders with consistently higher actual
win than the expected win will be termed as those who have higher market
power. Expected number of wins is defined as follows: consider A, who
bids on a total of 50 projects against a varying number of bidders, n` for
` = 1, . . . , 50. Then his expected win is defined to be
∑50
`=1 1/n`. By compar-
ing third and fourth column, we see that with the exception of five bidders,
all bidders win more contracts than expected. The fifth column reports the
average bid of each bidder and the sixth column reports the revenue share –
the total value of the bidder’s winning bid as a fraction of the total value of
16 The main point is, we can either use the tests from the literature and be agnostic about
the nature of the collusive ring or try and explore some other features besides the test to
determine the ring, in a hope that the exploration helps us find the “true” collusive rings.
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winning bids for all contracts. The last column is the participation rate (i.e.
the bid frequency rate), and bidder D is the one that stands out at 44%.
Table A-2 contains the summary statistics from which we can conclude:
(i) on an average there are slightly more than four bidders; (ii) average win-
ning bid is $3.33 million, which is less than the average engineers’ estimate
of $3.77 million while the average bid is $3.79 million; (iii) money on the
table – the difference between the highest and the second highest bid – is on
average $300,000 suggesting informational asymmetry among bidders. We
also find that distance between the bidder’s office and the site of project has
no bearing on the bids. In general higher valued projects (between $1 mil-
lion and $20 millions) attract relatively fewer bidders, suggesting that it is
the main bidders who can gain the most by colluding and moreover, larger
projects are more profitable, all else equal.
Now, we follow the tests proposed by [Bajari and Ye, 2003] on this sub-
sample of bids for twenty five type 1 bidders. The basic idea behind the
tests is to detect those bidders whose bidding pattern systemically violate
competitive and independent bidding. To increase the likelihood of pick-
ing a coalition we give more emphasis to bidders who participate in the
same auction because as the theoretical literature suggests ring members
tend to participate in the same auctions to enforce the bidding agreement.
To this end, we consider all combinations of pairs and select those bidders
that have at least fifteen simultaneous bids, see Table A-3. There are fifteen
bidders who bid frequently together.17
First, to test independence we consider the fifteen pairs of bidders bid-
ding frequently described above and estimate the following models for fif-
teen type 1 bidders and the remaining bidders, respectively
BIDi`/EE` = γ0 + γ1LDISTi` + γ2CAPi` + γ3UTILi` + γ4LMDISTi` + ui` (4)
BIDi`/EE` = α0 + α1LDISTi` + α2CAPi` + α3UTILi` + α4LMDISTi` + ςi`. (5)
Here LDISTi` is the logarithm of distance, LMDISTi` is the logarithm of the
minimum of distances of all bidders (except i) to the project ` and UTILi` is
the utilization rate of the capacity. We define the utilization rate as Utilit =
17This cutoff is based on the data and is big enough to capture the simultaneous bidding
but not too big so that we have enough observations left for the test.
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Backlogit/Capacityi, where backlog is defined as the past projects that were
won but yet to be completed and the capacity is the total capacity of bidder.
We find that approximately 60% of bids are explained by capacity, although
the effect varies across bidders; for more on the effect of capacity utilization
on bidding behavior see [Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer, 2003]. For the bid-
ders listed in Table A-3 (those who participate frequently) we estimate (4)
with bidder–varying coefficients and for the rest we use (5).
For every pair i, j, from the fifteen type 1 bidders, let ρij = corr(uˆi`, uˆj`),
be the correlation between estimated residuals. We use the Pearson’s corre-
lation test for independence and find that for all but one pair, bidder D and
W, we reject the null hypothesis of independence at 5% level; see Table A-4.
Second, we test exchangeability
H0 : (∀i, j, i 6= j), (∀s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) βis = β js,
HA : (∃i, j, i 6= j), (∃s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) βis 6= β js,
at both market level by pooling the fifteen bidders in one group and on a
pairwise basis. Let T = 3, 347 be the number of observations, m the number
of regressors and k the number of constraints implied by H0. Then under the
null the test statistic F = (SSRC−SSRU)/rSSRU/(T−m) ⇒
d F(r, T−m). At the market level,
exchangeability hypothesis imposes that the effect of the four explanatory
variables is the same for both potential ring members and the remaining
bidders. Since there are fourteen dummies (indexing the bidders) and for
each case there are four restrictions (under null), the total number of restric-
tions imposed under the null is k = 56. Here m = 748 and n−m = 2599 and
the estimated F− statistic is 5.934 with the upper tail area equal to 0.0000.
Therefore we reject the null of exchangeability when comparing the fifteen
bidders (potential cartel members) against the remaining bidders. The as-
sumption thus far is that all fifteen bidders form one single coalition and in
our counterfactual exercise of case 1, when we say potential colluders we
mean these fifteen bidders.
However, sustaining such a large coalition might be difficult. To see if we
can reduce the size of the coalition, we conduct pairwise tests by pooling
bidders accordingly and find that the hypothesis of exchangeability is re-
jected at conventional levels for 13 out of 15 pairs including the pair (D,P),
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(A,D) and (D,E). See Table A-5 for details. Comparing the “expected win”
with the actual win for these pairs, we do see that at least one member of
the pair wins often. Comparing Table A-1 and Table A-3 we can conclude
that : (i) firm A exclusively bids against firm D; (ii) firm E bids remarkably
frequently with both firm A and firm D; (iii) the pairs (D,P) and (A,D) have
the highest simultaneous bids. All of these suggest that bidders (A,D,E, P)
could be considered as potential collusive ring. Based on the previous anal-
ysis all pairs of bidders considered do not pass at least one of the tests for
competitive bidding. However, as mentioned above, taking into account the
number of simultaneous bids, bidders D and P bid simultaneously more of-
ten than others. And since the triplet (A,D,E) also fit the collusive behavior,
we consider colluding bidders to be (A, D, E, P).18
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS
In this section we present the main findings from estimation of the pseudo-
cost and from the counterfactual exercise of implementing CM-auction. As
we mentioned in the sections (2) and (4.1), we have two sets of type specific
costs and also two sets of colluders. The first case uses all the bids data to
recover cost and finds that fifteen out of twenty-five regular bidders could
be colluding according to Bajari and Ye [2003]. The second case takes into
account the fact that some bidders might already be colluding. To determine
the set of colluders we use the same tests as above and some other data fea-
tures, which allows us to identify a set of four bidders. In every auction
we discard all but the minimum bid by these four colluders to estimate the
cost.19
Let M` be the set of colluders who are present in auction ` and let i` ∈ N`
be the winner and b˜` the corresponding bid. Let o` be the smallest cost
amongst all bidders participating in auction `who do belong to the coalition
M`. That is if the winner belongs to the coalition, i.e. i` ∈ M`, then o` =
18 Ideally we would have liked to conduct the tests for every subsets of these fifteen
bidders not just the pairs, but the amount of data for each case is insufficient making the
tests unreliable.
19As mentioned earlier we assume that the coalition is rational and maximizes the total
payoff. This means only the bid corresponding to the lowest cost will be serious, the rest
will only be “cover-bids.”
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minj∈n`\M` Cˆj and if the winner is not a member of the coalition then we
can set o` = b˜`, the real winning bid. Then the difference between CM-
auction and the data is r` = o` − b˜` if the winner is a cartel member and
r` = 0 otherwise. Once we compute the change in cost r` for all auctions
the total change in cost of procuring is just
∑
` r`. For the first case the total
set of colluders is the fifteen bidders (see section 4.1) and M` = M ∩ n1`.
Likewise for the second case we find that only M = {A, B, D, E} bidders
are consistent with collusion and hence M` = n1` ∩ {A, B, D, E}. Figure 1
shows the empirical CDF of r` for these two cases.
We find that, in the first case with large coalition, implementing CM-
auction increases the total cost by 48.8%, while for the second case the cost
increases by 10.8%. This difference in cost is not surprising given the differ-
ence in size of the two rings.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we ask why do not sellers choose auction formats that are re-
silient to collusion? We find that one important reason could be that it could
be too expensive to choose such an auction. In particular, we use estimates
from California highway procurement data on CM-auction. CM-auction
have many advantages: it is not based on any equilibrium notion and uses
dominant strategy truthfulness; it is easy to implement and requires mini-
mal common knowledge assumption; and it is also robust with respect to
the transfer among ring members.
We find that the procurement cost could increase by anywhere between
10.8%, to 48.8%. The cost could be this high because the auction is always
efficient, so one way to reduce the cost could be relax this demand. But
to know the exact cost, one needs to estimate the entire revenue-efficiency
frontier.
Finally, we acknowledge that the exogenous entry assumption could be a
strong assumption. Even though we know much more about how to esti-
mate auctions with costly and selective entry, Gentry and Li [2014], as far as
we know, nothing is known about auctions that are both collusive dominant
strategy truthful and that allow bidders to collude prior to their participa-
tion decisions, which is an important area of research.
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APPENDIX
A-1. ESTIMATION
In this section we outline the estimation problem and discuss the choice
of bandwidths and kernels. To account for the skewness in the bid distri-
bution, a widely observed problem encountered with auction data, we use
logarithmic transformation. For notational simplicity we suppress the de-
pendance of the distributions on (X, N), unless otherwise noted. Log trans-
formation of (2) gives
ckM = ξk(dk, n) = edk − e
dk
(nk − 1) gkd(dk|·,·)1−Gkd(dk|·,·) + n1
g1d(dk|·,·)
1−G1d(dk|·,·)
(6)
where dk = ln(bk) and Gkd(·|·, ·), gkd(·|·, ·) are the distribution and density
of log(bk) for type k. Define KH(u) = |H|−1K(H−1u), where H is a non-
singular d × d matrix, the bandwidth matrix that usually takes the form
H = hId and |B| denotes its determinant. The observations are given by
{(ZTi , Yi) : i = 1, . . . , n}with Zi = (Xi, N0i, N1i)T. Let (x, n0, n1) be a point in
R3. The estimators involved are, as mentioned above Local Polynomial Esti-
mators. For our application, R = 2 and therefore we implement a LPE(2) for
each cdf involved and a LPE (1) for each pdf involved. Let YGp` = 1I(Bpl ≤ b).
Using a local quadratic approximation to estimate each cdf implies obtain-
ing the solution to the following least squares minimization problem
L∑
{`:I`=i}
i∑
p=1
{
YGp` −
[
β0 + β1(Xp` − x) + β2(N1` − n1) + β3(N0` − n0)
+β11(Xp` − x)2 + β12(Xp` − x)(N1` − n1) + β13(Xp` − x)(N0` − n0)
+β23(N0` − n0)(N1` − n1) + β22(N1` − n1)2 + β33(N0` − n0)2
]}2
KH (Z− z)
with respect to βG = (β0, β1, β2, β3, β11, β12, β13, β23, β22, β33). In particular
we are interested in β0 = G(b|x, n0, n1); see Fan and Gijbels [1996]. Then, we
know from the least squares theory that βˆG = (ZTGWGZG)
−1ZTGTGY, where
the design matrix ZG for the local quadratic case (what we use) is
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ZG =

1 (X1,1 − x) (N0,1 − n0) (N1,1 − n1) (X1,1 − x)2 (X1,1 − x)(N0,1 − n0)
...
...
...
...
...
...
1 (X1,ni − x) (N0,ni − n0) (N1,ni − n1) (X1,ni − x)2 (X1,ni − x)(N0,ni − n0)
(X1,1 − x)(N1,1 − n1) (N0,1 − n0)(N1,1 − n1) (N0,1 − n0)2 (N1,1 − n1)2
...
...
...
...
(X1,ni − x)(N1,ni − n1) (N0,ni − n0)(N1,ni − n1) (N0,ni − n0)2 (N1,ni − n1)2

For the densities involved define Ygp` =
1
h2g
K2g
(
Bp`−b
h2g
)
. We use a local
linear estimator, i.e. LPE(1) which, as before, is obtained as the solution to
the following least squares problem
L∑
{`:I`=i}
i∑
p=1
{
Ygp` − β0 + β1(Xp` − x) + β2(N1` − n1) + β3(N0` − n0)
}2
KH (Z− z)
It is well known that βˆg = (ZTTgZ)−1ZTTgY. The design matrix Z for the
local linear case is
Z =

1 (X1,1 − x) (N0,1 − n0) (N1,1 − n1)
...
...
...
...
1 (X1,ni − x) (N0,ni − n0) (N1,ni − x)
 .
The corresponding weighting matrix for each estimation procedure are TG =
diag{KH(Zi − z)} and Tg = diag{KH(Zi − z)}, respectively. The band-
widths and kernels involved for distributions and densities are different.
A-1.1. Choices of Kernels and Bandwidths. Since the exact choice of the
Kernels is not crucial for inference, we use product of univariate kernels to
represent the multivariate kernel, i.e.
Km
(
a− Ak
hg
,
b− Bk
hg
,
n− Nk
hgn
)
= Ka
(
a− Ak
hg
)
Kb
(
b− Bk
hg
)
Kn
(
n− Nk
hgn
)
.
Here, Km(·, ·, ·) is the multivariate Kernel, Ka(·) and Kb(·) denote the uni-
variate Kernels corresponding to the continuous variables A and B, respec-
tively, and Kn(·) is the kernel for the discrete variables such that Kn(·) :=
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Kn0(·) · Kn1(·) · Kn2(·). The kernels for continuous variables should be sym-
metric with bounded supports, so we decided to use the Epanechnikov Ker-
nel function K(u) = 3/4(1− u2)1I(|u| ≤ 1), as it is an optimal Kernel in the
sense that it minimizes the asymptotic mean squared error over all non-
negative functions Fan, Gasser, Gijbels, Brockmann, and Engel [1993]. For
the discrete variables, we use Gaussian Kernel because, as there is less vari-
ation in the number of bidders it is desirable to give less weight to obser-
vations farther from the point at which estimation takes place and is best
achieved with a kernel with unbounded support.20 We assume the smooth-
ness parameter R = 2 for the cost distribution. To ensure uniform consis-
tency at the optimal rates, the bandwidths for the continuous variables are
chosen to be hg = 1.06× 2.214× σˆ× (T)−1/(2R+1), hG = 1.06× 2.214× σˆ×
(T)−1/(2R+3). The constant term comes from the so–called rule of thumb
and the factor 2.978 is the one corresponding to the use of Epanechnikov
Kernels instead of Gaussian Kernels; see [Hardle, 1991].
20There are no theoretical restrictions to the kernels applied to discrete variables.
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A-2. TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE A-1. Revenue Shares and Participation of Main Firms
Firm Number of Number of Exp. Number Average bid Revenue Participation
ID Bids wins of wins (Mill. $) Share rate
A 50 9 10.34 4.83 0.020 0.07
B 34 13 10.51 3.21 0.012 0.05
C 43 9 10.46 5.32 0.013 0.06
D 319 97 87.32 3.61 0.145 0.44
E 46 11 10.15 4.49 0.015 0.06
F 42 15 10.70 3.63 0.016 0.06
G 25 12 5.84 4.09 0.027 0.03
H 26 6 5.16 5.03 0.011 0.04
I 21 7 4.27 4.54 0.012 0.03
J 20 9 4.69 3.84 0.015 0.03
K 34 4 6.90 8.44 0.019 0.05
L 35 16 7.95 4.32 0.020 0.05
M 29 13 6.94 3.69 0.016 0.04
N 9 3 1.55 6.33 0.012 0.01
O 31 5 6.82 6.37 0.011 0.04
P 50 16 12.95 4.03 0.027 0.07
Q 33 9 6.31 3.35 0.017 0.05
R 28 10 8.10 3.48 0.012 0.04
S 47 12 8.82 4.37 0.021 0.06
T 25 13 5.99 3.75 0.021 0.03
U 68 16 15.22 4.77 0.026 0.09
V 26 7 4.78 5.75 0.025 0.04
W 41 11 7.18 2.92 0.019 0.06
X 41 7 10.27 4.50 0.021 0.06
Y 11 4 1.89 6.04 0.012 0.02
Total 1148 351 282 0.57
Only bidders with revenue shares ≥ 1% are reported.
TABLE A-2. Summary Statistics
No. observations Mean SD
No. Bidders 724 4.62 2.37
Winning bid 724 3.33 3.11
Money on the table 724 0.30 0.46
Engineers’ Estimate 724 3.77 3.49
All Bids 3347 3.79 3.51
Backlog 3347 4.30 9.76
Distance (miles) 3347 123.98 162.93
Capacity (across bidders) 413 2.30 5.69
Utilization rate 3347 0.20 0.32
All dollar figures are expressed in millions. Utilization rate is the ratio of backlog to
capacity.
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TABLE A-3. Summary of Simultaneous Bids
Bidder # of Simultaneous # of Expected First bidder of the Pair Second bidder of the Pair
Pair Bids Wins Wins Wins
(A,D) 44 9.03 9 5
(A,E) 20 4.05 3 6
(B,D) 29 9.51 12 10
(C,D) 17 5.65 5 9
(D,E) 41 8.67 8 9
(D,F) 26 7.46 5 9
(D,H) 19 3.92 7 3
(D,I) 18 3.68 1 7
(D,O) 25 5.16 7 5
(D,P) 44 11.08 13 14
(D,R) 27 7.96 10 10
(D,V) 22 4.20 5 6
(D,W) 19 2.97 2 3
(M,X) 22 4.91 11 2
(W,X) 15 2.81 5 2
TABLE A-4. Conditional Independence Test
Bidder Pair Test Statistic p-value n deg. freedom
(A,D) 0.7660 0.0000 44 42
(A,E) 0.7427 0.0002 20 18
(B,D) 0.7331 0.0000 29 27
(C,D) 0.9239 0.0000 17 15
(D,E) 0.6530 0.0000 41 39
(D,F) 0.7570 0.0000 26 24
(D,H) 0.4734 0.0406 19 17
(D,I) 0.7121 0.0009 18 16
(D,O) 0.7643 0.0000 25 23
(D,P) 0.8538 0.0000 44 42
(D,R) 0.8555 0.0000 27 25
(D,V) 0.6877 0.0004 22 20
(D,W) 0.4305 0.0658 19 17
(M,X) 0.6529 0.0010 22 20
(W,X) 0.6271 0.0123 15 13
TABLE A-5. Exchangeability Test on Pairwise Basis
PAIR F UTA k m n-m
(A,D) 5,2001 0,0000 8 796 2551
(A,E) 2.3540 0.0161 8 796 2551
(B,D) 5.9354 0.0000 8 796 2551
(C,D) 8.4271 0.0000 8 796 2551
(D,E) 7.9549 0.0000 8 796 2551
(D,F) 6.8441 0.0000 8 796 2551
(D,H) 5.2001 0.0000 8 796 2551
(D,I) 4.1670 0.0001 8 796 2551
(D,O) 5.5088 0.0000 8 796 2551
(D,P) 7.1682 0.0000 8 796 2551
(D,R) 6.1147 0.0000 8 796 2551
(D,V) 3.7384 0.0002 8 796 2551
(D,W) 4.6217 0.0000 8 796 2551
(M,X) 0.7984 0.6040 8 796 2551
(W,X) 0.3509 0.9458 8 796 2551
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FIGURE 1. ECDFs of extra cost under competition and collusion, respectively.
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Supplementary Appendix: Not for Publication
STEPS FOR ESTIMATION
To make the estimation procedure transparent we outline the steps re-
quired to estimate the (pseudo) costs:
(1) Case 1: Competition case where collusion comes only for counterfac-
tual.
(a) Choose appropriate Kernels and determine the optimal band-
widths, see Section (A-1.1).
(b) Use {{b0i}n0`i=1, X`}L`=1 to estimate gˆ0(b|X`n0`) and Gˆ0(b|X`, n0`)}
on [min b0, max b0] such that gˆ0(b|·, ·) = 0 if b 6∈ [min b0, max b0].
(c) Suppressing the conditioning variables, define gˆ0(b) = max(0, gˆ0(b))
and Gˆ0(b) = min(1, Gˆ0(b)).
(d) Repeat Steps (3) and (4) for {{b1i}n0`i=1, X`}L`=1 to estimate gˆ1(b|X`, n1`)
and Gˆ1(b|X`, n1`)}.
(e) Use the estimates {Gˆ0, gˆ0} evaluated at b0 and {Gˆ1, gˆ1} evalu-
ated at b1 to interpolate:
(i) For every b0i from the type 0 bids, find the highest lower
bound of bid b1i(b0i) and the lowest upper bound b1i(b0i)from
type 1 bids data such that bi1(b0i) ≤ b0i ≤ bi1(b0i).
(ii) Determine the weight w0i =
b0i−b1i(b0i)
b1i(b0i)−b1i(b0i)
.
(iii) Then define gˆ1(b0i) = w0i gˆ1(b1i(b0i))+ (1−w0i)gˆ1(b1i(b0i)).
(iv) Similarly, determine Gˆ1(b0i) = w0iGˆ1(b1i(b0i))+ (1−w0i)Gˆ1(b1i(b0i)).
(v) Repeat (a) - (d) for all bids b0i in the domain of observed
range of bids b1i. For bids b0i not in the domain put the
interpolation density to zero.
(vi) Repeat (a) - (e) for bids b1i.21
(f) The corresponding estimates of the (pseudo) costs are
21We have now 4 sets, the cdf/pdf for both types evaluated at their corresponding data
and then the remaining 2 sets that are determined from interpolation of the estimated
cdf/pdf.
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(i) The cost c0i of bidder i ∈ n0` who bids b`0i is
c`0i =

b0i − 1
(n0−1) gˆ0(b0i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)1−Gˆ0(b0i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)+n1
gˆ1(b0i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)
1−Gˆ1(b0i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)
, if b0i ∈ [mini b1i, maxi b1i],
b0i − 1
(n0−1) gˆ0(b0i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)1−Gˆ0(b0i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)
, o/w,
(ii) Similarly, cost c1i of bidder i ∈ n1` is
c`1i =

b1i − 1
(n1`−1) gˆ1(b1i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)1−Gˆ1(b1i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)+n0
gˆ0(b1i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)
1−Gˆ0(b1i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)
, if b1i ∈ [mini b0i, maxi b0i],
b1i − 1
(n1`−1) gˆ1(b1i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)1−Gˆ1(b1i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)
, o/w,
(g) Then we have {{c0i}n0`i=1, {c1i}n1`i=1, ` = 1, 2, . . . , L} pseudo-cost
vectors.
(h) To implement the counterfactual, we do the Bajari and Ye [2003]
tests on the type 1 bidders. We determine 15 bidders whose bid-
ding is at-odds with independent bidding and competition.
(2) Case 2: Estimating with Collusion:
(a) We begin with n0` type-0 and n1` type-1 bidders.
(b) We follow Aryal and Gabrielli [2013] and identify four bidders
M = {A, B, D, E}who are treated as colluders and take this into
account while estimating pseudo-costs.
(c) Determine M` = M ∩ n1`, the set of bidders in auction `, for
every auction.
(d) Since type-0 case is unaltered, repeat 1(a)-1(d) to determine {Gˆ0, gˆ0}
(e) Determine the collusive bids for every auction, i.e. the set {b1i :
i ∈ M`}, ` = 1, . . . , L, and for every auction determine {b∗1`}L`=1.
Then, the effective type-1 bidder from the point of view of col-
luding bidders is n∗1` = n1` − (|M`| − 1) as the coalition M` is
effectively treated as a single bidder, while the number of type-
1 bidders for those outside M` is still n1`. So we consider two
sub-cases: 22
(f) Colluders:
22It is possible that in an auction, M` = 1, in which case the minimum is just the bid and
everything is the same. This means, we have two sets of {G1, g1} one for M` and the other
for the rest.
28 GAURAB ARYAL∗ AND MARIA F. GABRIELLI∗∗
(i) In every auction we discard all but the minimum bid of the
ring. Let {{b∗1i}
n∗1`
i=1 : ` = 1, . . . , L} be the type 1 bids.
(ii) Using this set repeat 1(e) to estimate the pair {Gˆ∗1 , gˆ∗1}.
(iii) Using the estimates from 2(d) and 2(f-ii), repeat the steps
1(f) and 1(g) to determine the pseudo-cost of the cartel:
c∗1` =

b∗1` − 1
(n∗1`−1)
gˆ∗1 (b∗1` |X` ,n0` ,n
∗
1`)
1−Gˆ∗1 (b∗1` |X` ,n0` ,n
∗
1`)
+n0
gˆ0(b
∗
1` |X` ,n0` ,n1`)
1−Gˆ0(b∗1` |X` ,n0` ,n1`)
, if b∗1` ∈ [mini b0i, maxi b0i],
b∗1` − 1
(n∗1`−1)
gˆ∗1 (b∗1` |X` ,n0` ,n
∗
1`)
1−Gˆ∗1 (b∗1` |X` ,n0` ,n
∗
1`)
, o/w,
(g) Non-colluders: Since they still think they compete with n1` bid-
ders, so like Case 1 we get
c`1i =

b1i − 1
(n1`−1)
gˆ∗1 (b1i |X` ,n0` ,n∗1`)
1−Gˆ∗1 (b1i |X` ,n0` ,n∗1`)
+n0
gˆ0(b1i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)
1−Gˆ0(b1i |X` ,n0` ,n1`)
, if b1i ∈ [mini b0i, maxi b0i],
b1i − 1
(n1`−1)
gˆ∗1 (b1i |X` ,n0` ,n∗1`)
1−Gˆ∗1 (b1i |X` ,n0` ,n∗1`)
, o/w,
(h) Then we have {{c0i}n0`i=1, {c1i}n1`\{M`}i=1 , {c∗1`}; ` = 1, 2, . . . , L} pseudo-
cost vectors.23
(i) Then we can implement the collusion-proof mechanism.
23 To estimate the type 0 cost, we use {Gˆ∗1 , gˆ∗1} and {Gˆ0, gˆ}.
